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ABSTRACT 
The victim-pe1petrator duel identity of the child soldier creates a moral 
dilemma with regards to the issue of criminal responsibility under 
international law. On the one hand attention must be given to the 
vulnerability of children in the context of war, but on the other it is hard to 
ignore the atrocities they may commit voluntarily, particularly when these 
are directed against the civilian population. 
This paper seeks to examine the current array of international law dealing 
with the protection and prosecution of child soldiers and determine whether it 
effectively deals with the above duel identity child soldier problem. After 
finding that the law in effect grants impunity to all child soldiers, it is argued 
that attributing criminal responsibility to those who have voluntarily 
committed atrocities is not only in the best interests of the children themselves 
but the wider community. 
The paper then proceeds to explore how this can be done by looking to 
concepts of juvenile justice which promote a restorative justice approach of 
involving all stakeholders of a crime to repair a wrong. The differing 
retributive and restorative approaches used in post conflict Rwanda, Uganda 
and Sierra Leone will then be analysed in order to propose what this author 
believes is the best way to attribute criminal responsibility to the duel identity 
victim-pe1petrator child solder in the future. 
Word Length: 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendices) comprises approximately 14830 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to international aimed conflict, children are often viewed as 
victims. In recent decades they have been said to represent half of the total amount of 
civilian casualties in armed conflict around the world. 1 UNICEF reports that more than 2 
million have died as a result of anned conflict and at least 6 million have been 
permanently disabled or se1iously injured.2 
However, children may not always be mere civilians in times of armed conflict. In 
many countries the recrnitment of children into the aimed forces is a common occun-ence 
and it is estimated that some 300000 children, both boys and girls, are today involved in 
more than 30 conflicts worldwide.3 The te1m 'child soldier' is in itself a paradox. It is 
hard to imagine a child with a gun or weapon in their hand taking pmt in warfare, war is 
not child's play. Nevertheless child soldiers do exist and their roles Vat)' from being used 
indirectly as messengers, porters, cooks and providing sexual services to being 
combatants fighting against opposition forces.4 
In tenns of dealing with these child soldiers, international law tends to deal with 
them as victims, victims who should not be placed in a situation of armed conflict to 
begin with. Whilst at first this may seem to be an appropriate position to take, it does not 
make sense when considering some of the heinous acts a child soldier may commit as a 
combatant. This is especially so in instances where they have committed atrocities 
against the civilian population. 
This paper begins with a brief overview of the nature of child recrnitment and 
their role and use in hostilities with a view to understanding the following section of the 
paper which examines how international law protects child soldiers as victims of 
recrnitment. Recognising that child soldiers have a duel identity, the paper then examines 
1 UNICEF "Fact sheet - Child Soldiers" www.unicef.org (accessed 29 September 2008). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 
how international law deals with child soldiers as perpetrators. It is found that the cuITent 
airny of international law inadequately deals with the duel victim-perpetrator identity of 
the child soldier as it effectively grants impunity to all child soldiers alike including those 
above the minimum age of recrnitment who may be responsible for committing war 
c1imes. In light of this it is argued that in some instances it is necessa1y and in the best 
interests of the child as a perpetrator to recognise their wrongs and to be held criminally 
responsible for their actions. 
With this in mind the paper then looks to the practice and underlying concepts of 
juvenile justice and proposes that the best solution to deal with child soldiers under 
international law is through a restorative justice approach. This approach of taking into 
account all stakeholders to a c1ime and recognising and repairing the wrongs done has 
been implemented in both Uganda and SieITa Leone in order to deal with child soldiers 
post conflict. The paper then proceeds to explore the diffe1ing approaches used in both 
countries and identifies that their sho1tfall is that they work in isolation of any fonn of 
prosecution or punishment which in some instances is needed for the community to see 
that justice is done. Finally it is submitted that a hybrid approach of dealing with child 
soldiers which involves both restorative and retributive elements, modelled on the gacaca 
system in Rwanda, is necessaiy in order to effectively deal with the duel identity 
dilemma of the child soldier. 
II THE RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS - VICTIMS IN NEED OF 
PROTECTION 
A Voluntary Recruitment 
In count1ies constantly the subject of international or civil anned conflict children 
grow up in situations of hai·d poverty. As society breaks down children are left with no 
access to education, some are forced to flee from their homes whilst others are sepai·ated 
from their families often making a choice to join the military forces a choice of survival. 5 
5 Human Rights Watch www.hrw.org ( accessed 12 August 2008 ). 
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Some children feel obliged to become soldiers for their own protection, feeling safer with 
a gun on their hands than without.6 
Although classification of recruitment is usually split between involuntary and 
voluntary recruitment, in the case of child soldiers the notion of 'voluntary' recruitment is 
considered a misnomer because of the cultural, political and natural circumstances 
surrounding a child ' s so called free choice to join armed forces. 7 Children in these 
situations are not true 'volunteers' , their choice to join the armed forces is better 
described as a forced choice. 
However, there are situations where children's "expectations and feelings of 
empowe1ment and competence, both before and during war" may have an impact on their 
decision to take up arms. 8 Some may choose to fight to revenge the death of family 
members while others may see themselves as fighting for a cause in reaction to injustices 
they or their family may have faced.9 Children may also choose to take up arms in 
conflicts where war activities are glorified and where military life is the most attractive 
option available to gain power in an otherwise powerless and destitute situation. 10 These 
children may be considered true free willing 'volunteers'. 
B Involuntary Recruitment 
In other situations, children are abducted from their homes to fill the ranks. 11 
They are perceived as cheap and obedient. 12 Not only are children less socialised, more 
docile and malleable than adults, but because of their evolving mental and moral 
6 
Graca Machel " lmpact of Aimed Conflict on Children" (26 August 1996) A/51 /306, para 41 [" Impact of 
Am1ed Conflict on Children"]. 
7 No Peace without Justice and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre International Crim in al Justice and 
Children (September 2002) 73 [International Criminal Ju stice and Children]. 
8 Illene Cohn Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Anned Conflict (Ox ford University Press, New York , 
1994) 30 [Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Anned Conflict]. 
9 Sie1Ta Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Sierra Leone Volum e 3b, Chapter 4: Children and th e Anned Conflict in Sierra Leone 
(2007) www .trcsie1i-aleone.org (accessed 12 August 2008), para 218 [The Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone Volum e 3b, Chapter 4: Children and the Anned Conflict in 
Sierra Leone]. 
10 " Impact of Anned Conflict on Children", above n 6, para 42. 
11 Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Aimed Conflict, above n 8, 24 . 
12 International Criminal Ju stice and Children, above n 7 , 73. 
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development they may also be more prone to behaving badly. 
13 These make children an 
attractive option to military commanders as they are more easily persuaded or coerced 
into committing atrocities. 14 Furthe1more drng use, trauma and deprivation helps these 
children can-y out brntal acts and massacres with little fear and revulsion and with greater 
enthusiasm and brntality than adults. 15 
Initiation processes ensure there is no going back. Children are made to can-y out 
brntal acts on their own families conve11ing them into perpetrators , closing them off from 
their community and helping foster a "dependency relationship with their captors, 
eventually even coming to identify with their cause."
16 
Although there are clearly differences in the way children may find their way into 
the anned forces, International law tends to view all children in these situations as 
victims, victims who should not be given the opp011unity in the first place to be subjected 
to a military life in the midst of anned conflict. 
III HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW PROTECTS CHILDREN FROM 
RECRUITMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES 
A International Humanitarian Law 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions were the first to take into account the special 
needs and vulnerabilities of children in aimed conflict. Geneva Convention IV provides 
protection for civilians in times of war, this includes children. AI1icle 24 creates an 
obligation for children under the age of 15 not being left to their own resources after 
war 17 and article 50 provides for the facilitation and proper working of all institutions 
13 Matthew Happold "The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes under International 
Law" in Karin Arts and Vesselin Popovski (eds) International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of 
Children (Hague Academic Press, Netherlands, 2006)70[International Criminal Accountability and the 
Rights of Children]. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, above n 8, 26. 
16 Ibid , 27. 
17 Geneva Convention IV (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 285 , art 24 . 
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dedicated to the care and education of children. 18 More importantly under Article 51, as 
protected persons, children may not be compelled to serve in the aimed or auxiliary 
forces of an occupying power and they may not be compelled to undertake any work 
which would involve them taking part in milita.1y operations. 19 Fmthermore the 
occupying power may not compel protected persons to work unless they are above the 
age of 18.20 
Although these provisions protected children from involuntary recmitment, it was 
not until the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 that specific 
a1ticles came into existence obliging states to refrain from recmiting persons under the 
age of 15.21 Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I states that pa.Jties to an international 
armed conflict shall take "all feasible measures in order that children who have not 
attained the age of 15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in pa.Jticular, they 
shall refrain from recmiting them into their armed forces."22 However it must be noted 
that Alticle 77(3) contemplates the possibility of child recruitment in exceptional cases 
despite the prohibition by requiring that children benefit from special protection if they 
are to fall into the power of an adverse party.23 
A1ticle 4(3) of Additional Protocol II, which applies to internal armed conflicts, 
states that: "children who have not attained the age of 15 yea.1·s shall neither be recmited 
into the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take pa.Jt in hostilities."24 This prohibition 
is more ce1tain and it does not limit their pa1ticipation to just taking a direct pa11 in 
hostilities unlike the fonner a.Jticle which implies that the prohibition does not extend to 
children who maybe recmited to unde1take more indirect roles in a conflict. The 
implications of this are considered below where the same problem is encountered in 
international human rights law dealing with children in a.1med conflict. 
18 Ibid , a11 50 . 
19 Ibid , ait 51. 
20 Ibid , art 51 . 
21 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3. art 77; Additional 
Protocol I1 to the Geneva Conventions (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 609 , aii4. 
22 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3, art 77. 
23 Ibid . 
24 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 609, art 4 . 
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B International Human Rights Law 
I United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC/
5 
The CRC sets out the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of 
children. As a widely ratified treaty, it grants many protections to othe1wise vulnerable 
children all over the world. However it does have its limitations, creating only obligations 
with no real sanctions for a breach. 
Although a child is defined in the CRC as any person under the age of 18
26
, 
Article 38 obliges states "to take all feasible measures to ensure persons who have not 
attained the age of 15 do not take a direct pait in hostilities ."
27 It also states that states 
should refrain from recruiting anyone who is not 15 into the aimed forces, but with 
regai·ds to recruiting those between the ages of 15 and 18, priority should be given to the 
oldest.28 
The problem with these provisions is that they do not prohibit the use of children 
indirectly in hostilities. Such indirect use would include paiticipating in military 
operations such as gathe1ing infonnation , transmitting orders, transporting ammunition 
and foodstuffs, or acts of sabotage.2
9 These are acts which put children at just as great a 
risk as those children paiticipating directly in hostilities. In fact carrying out roles as spies 
and messengers in hostilities puts all children under suspicion.
30 If they are captured this 
may be just as dangerous as placing a gun in their hands and sending them out to fight. 
Also as noted in the Graca Machel report whilst children of both sexes may stait out as 
indirect suppo1t, it does not take long before they are placed in the heat ofbattle.
31 
25 Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989) 1577 UNTS 3. 
26 Ibid , art I . 
27 Ibid , a11 38(2). 
28 
Ibid , a11 38(3 ). 
29 Daniel Helle "Optional Protocol on the In vo lvement of Children in Armed Conflict to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child" (2000) 839 lntemational Rev iew of the Red Cross 797 www.icrc.org (accessed 24 
September 2008). 
30 "Impact of Armed Conflict on Children", above n 6, para 44 . 
3 1 Ibid , para 4 7. 
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Fmthermore the provisions imply that children between the ages of 15 and 18 can 
be recruited for use in the armed forces. So although the CRC seeks to protect and give 
rights to all children below the age of 18, it fails to do so with regards to recruitment in 
the anned forces. This age limit was a result of difficult political compromise and was 
already considered too low by many at the time of the adoption of the CRC.32 However 
when conside1ing the difficulties of arriving at a consensus when issues of age are dealt 
with differently across different jurisdictions, it is better to have a provision in the CRC 
prohibiting recruitment which has a minimum age of 15 rather than have no provision at 
all. In many countries children do not have the luxury of simply being children. Taking 
on many responsibilities at a young age they are considered to be adults by those around 
them.33 It is therefore difficult for some states to endorse a minimum age greater than 15 
years when those above this age are no longer seen to have the necessary qualities 
deserving of protection. Had the minimum age been lifted to 18 , the CRC may not have 
been as widely ratified as it has been.34 
In 2002 the Optional Protocol to the CRC attempted to deal with this problem in 
Altic le 1 by obliging states to "take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their 
armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct pait in 
hostilities."35 It also states that anyone below the age of 18 should not be compulsorily 
recruited into the aimed forces. 36 However this still allows for the indirect use of children 
below the age of 18 who have voluntarily been recruited and under Alticle 3 of the statute 
this can be done provided certain safeguards are put in place.37 
32 Vesselin Popovski "Children in Armed Conflict: Law and Practice of the United Nations" in 
International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children, above n 13 , 38. 
33 Angela Veale "The Criminal Responsibility of Former Child Soldiers: Contributions from Psychology" 
in International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children, above n 13 , 106. 
34 The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by 192 States, nearly all the States in the 
world , with the exception of the United States of America and Somalia. 
35 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict UNGA Resolution . 54/263 (25 May 2000) A/RES/54/263 , a11 l . 
36 Ibid , a11 2 . 
37 Ibid , a11 3(3 ). 
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As with the CRC, the Optional Protocol too is without sanction for a breach. 
Although there are committees in place monitoring and repo11ing on state compliance, 
realistically this is the limit of its enforceability. 
2 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
38 
The African Chai1er on the Rights and Welfare of the Child entered into force in 
1999 and has been ratified by 37 of the 53 African countlies which ai·e pa11y to the 
Organisation of African Unity. Like the CRC it recognises the uniqueness of children and 
the need to have in place pai1icular safeguai·ds and guarantees to promote their welfare in 
an unstable African environment. In fact many of its provisions are modelled on the 
CRC. 
Under AI1icle 22 it obliges state pai1ies to respect and ensure respect for rules of 
international humanitarian law applicable in aimed conflicts to children, thus endorsing 
the Geneva Convention and the Optional Protocols.
39 More specifically it also obliges 
State Pai1ies to take "all necessai-y measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct pai1 
in hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting any child."
40 The rules also apply to 
situations of"intemal am1ed conflicts, tension and strife."
41 What is noticeably missing is 
a specified minimum age as is present in the CRC. However the Chai1er defines a child 
as anyone below the age of 18.42 So unlike the CRC the protection granted in armed 
conflict is implied and extended to all children, notjust those below the age of 15. 
The Chai1er and its prov1s10ns m respect of children in armed conflict are a 
significant stepping stone for African nations where the use of child soldiers in aimed 
conflict has been most prevalent. However countries such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Sudan where there has been recent use of child soldiers in civil conflict ai·e 
yet to ratify this Charter. It must be noted however that Sudan has signed the Optional 
38 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (11 July 1990) CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
39 Ibid , art 22. 
40 Ibid , art 22(2). 
41 Ibid , art 22(3). 
42 Ibid , art 2. 
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Protocol to the CRC and some paities to the conflict have collaborated with UNICEF to 
demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers back to their families and communities.43 
3 International Labour Organisation (!LO) Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention 182, 1999 
The ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182 which defines a child as 
"all persons under the age of 18"44 requires state parties to "take immediate and effective 
measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour."45 
For the purposes of the Convention this includes the recruitment and use of children in 
armed conflict. The Convention therefore implies a prohibition on the recruitment and 
use of children under the age of 18 in an armed conflict. 
The Convention has been widely ratified, however apart from reporting 
mechanisms and requi1ing state parties to "take all necessaiy measures to ensure the 
effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions ... including the provision and 
application of penal sanctions,"46 it too lacks international criminal sanction for a breach. 
Although all of the above international humanitarian and human 1ights law 
instruments may seem unhelpful when it comes to attributing responsibility and 
sanctioning breaches of a provision, they still serve as an important indicator towards the 
customary law prohibition on the recruitment of child soldiers which will be dealt with 
later in the paper. It also must be remembered that the prohibitions contained in these 
instruments also serve as a deteJTent for the possibility of future abuses of the use of 
children in aimed conflict. The instmments ai·e there to protect and the duty to implement 
these rights and respect them lies first and foremost with the states parties themselves.47 
43 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Sudan: Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 
www.childsoldiersglobalrepo1t.org (accessed 24 September 2008) . 
44 lnternational Labour Organisation Worst Fonm of Labour Convention 182, (17 June 1999) art 2. 
45 fbid , art I . 
46 Ibid , art 7. 
47 lnternational Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian La111: Answers to your Questions 
www.icrc .org (accessed 24 September 2008) 36 . 
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States recognise that the observance of the law is in their interest, and that every 
violation may also bring pai1icular undesirable consequences.
48 
A state which breaches 
provisions whilst not attracting formal sanction will still receive negative responses and 
reactions from other states that will not condone their actions. This means that a state 
may be detened from allowing recruitment, or be forced to take action from the mere 
reactions and responses of other states or even non-governmental organisations. Take for 
exan1ple UNICEF, whom upon discovering the use of child soldiers in many states will 
publish statements and negotiate and work with the governments involved in order to 
demobilise child soldiers.49 There is also the risk of losing international reputation and 
haiming relations with other states. This is pai1icularly impo11ant for states that rely on 
the goodwill and economic relations of other states this is an important factor as one does 
not wish to make an enemy out of a fiiend. A reputation for honouring commitments 
benefits a state by increasing the possibilities of future beneficial cooperation with other 
states. 50 
C International Criminal Law - The Rome Statute 
Finally in 2002 the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
c1iminalised the use of children in hostilities. At1icle 8(2)(b)(xxvi) makes the 
"conscription and enlistment of children under the age of 15 into the national aimed 
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities"51 in an international armed 
conflict a war crime. This provision is a result of negotiation and compromise by 
countries with divergent opinions on the matter. These compromises are evident from the 
wording of the provision. 
48 Louis Henkin How Nation s Behave: Law and Foregin Policy (2 nd ed, Columbia University Press, New 
York , 1979) 320. 
49 UNICEF has undertaken negotiation and demobilisation processes in many countries such as Sri Lanka 
where child oldiers have been recruited see BBC News "UNICEF holds child soldier talks" (4 March 
2003) www.bbc.co.uk (accessed 24 September 2008). 
50 Robe1t E Scott, Paul B Stephen "Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion" 
2004 Wisconsin Law Review 551 , 590. 
51 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Cou1t (17 July 1998) A/CONF 183/9; 2187 UNTS 90, art 
8(2)(b)(xxvi). 
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The Statute uses the words 'conscripting' and 'enlisting' as opposed to 
'recruiting' which we have seen in the above humanitarian and human law treaties. When 
drafting the Statute, options ranged from outlawing "recruiting children under the age of 
15 years into armed forces or groups; or allowing them to take part in hostilities" to 
prohibiting "forcing [them] to take direct part in hostilities."52 Recruiting was used in an 
earlier draft but was rejected by some countties, however these countties accepted the 
terms 'conscripting' and 'enlisting' which we now find in the finalised Statute. 53 
Compared with 'recruitment,' these terms "suggest something more passive such as 
putting the name of a person on a list."54 
Many texts generally state that prohibition also applies to conflicts of a non-
international character, however Al1icle 8(2)(e)(vii) which applies to conflicts not of an 
international character prohibits "conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or groups or using them to pat1icipate actively in hostilities."55 
Although not evident at first sight there is a difference between the two provisions. This 
is the inclusion of the word 'national' before armed forces in A11icle 8(2)(b)(xxvi). As 
noted by Schabas this inclusion was a result of the concerns of several Arab States who 
feared that the term might cover the young Palestinians joining the intifada56 revolt 
against Israeli occupation.57 
52 See Thomas Graditzky "War Crime Issues Before the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the 
Establishment ofan International Criminal Court" University of California, Davis Journal oflnternationa l 
Law and Policy 5:2 1999 199,206 in Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (eds) Th e International Criminal 
Court (Da11mouth Publishing Company/Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2004) 127 ["War Crime 
Issues Before the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court"]. 
53 Ibid. 
54 William A Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2001) 50 [An Introduction to th e International Criminal Court]. See also 
Kofi Annan "Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment ofa Special Cou11 for Sie1Ta Leone" (4 
October 2000) UN Doc S/2000/915,para 18. 
55 Rome Statute of the International C1iminal Cow1, above n 51, art 8(2)( e)(vii). 
56 Intifada is also known as a mass uprising. In regards to the Israel - Palestinian conflict protest took the 
fonn of civil disobedience, general strikes, boycotts, barTicades, graffiti and stone throwing demonstrations 
against heavily-armed occupation troops see BBC New A History of Conflict: Israel and the Palestinians 
www.news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 22 September 2000). 
57 An Introduction to th e International Criminal Court, above n 54. 
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By limiting the prohibition to only "pa.I1icipate actively" in hostilities, on the face 
of it the Statute, like the CRC, also appears to allow and condone the indirect use of 
children. However it was made clear whilst drafting this w3.1· c1ime that: 58 
The words "using" and "participate" have been adopted in order to cover both direct 
pai1icipation in combat and also active pa11icipation in military activities linked to combat 
such as scouting, spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys , couriers or at military 
checkpoints. It would not cover activities clearly unrelated to the hostilities such as food 
deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff in an officer's ma1Tied accommodation. 
However, use of children in a direct suppo11 function such as acting bearers to take supplies 
to the front li11e, or activities at the front line itself, would be included within the 
te1111inology. 
Much of the time children initially stm1 out in these suppo11 functions and 3.1·e 
later placed in the heat of battle,59 the above explanatory statement ensures that 
commanders can not use the wording of the provision to shirk from responsibility where 
this has occmTed or where there is active pm1icipation in military activities linked to 
combat. It is just as impo11ant that these children m·e protected as their roles are just as 
life-threatening and dangerous as the children who are fighting with guns.60 
Thus the Rome Statute appears to provide an adequate coverage of protection for 
children who 3.1·e victims of recruitment. It also sufficiently protects children who take 
pm1 directly and indirectly in hostilities as long as there is a link to combat. The only 
sho11fall of the Rome Statute provisions appea.I·s to be maintaining the minimum age for 
recruitment at 15 yem·s. However this decision would have been influenced by the 
international humanita.I·ian prohibition at the time which had set the age at 15. The 
Additional Protocol to the CRC, the Aftican Chm1er and ILO Worst fo1ms of Child 
Labour Convention which raised the age to 18 all cmne into effect after the Rome Statute. 
58 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Cow1, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Addendum, Pa11 One (14 April 1998) 
A/CONF.183 /2/Add.1, 2. 
59 "Impact of Aimed Conflict on Children", above n 6, para 47 . 
60 "Impact of Armed Conflict on Children" above n 6, para 44. 
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However despite this, the addition of the Rome Statute provision to the cun-ent 
an-ay of international humanitarian and human law finally gave some teeth to the 
obligation not to recruit child soldiers. The decision on its inclusion in the statute is said 
to have been one of the most positive results of the Rome Conference. 61 It means that 
Commanders who recruit those under the age of 15 can now be prosecuted and face 
individual c1iminal responsibility under the jurisdiction of the International Ciiminal 
Court. Although to date there have been no prosecutions under the Rome Statute 
provisions, several leaders including Former Liberian President Charles Taylor have been 
charged for conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces 
or groups under the identical provision in the Statute of the Special Court for Sien-a 
Leone.62 
D Customary International Law 
Opinio Juris and state practice63 have established that the rules prohibiting the 
recruitment of children into the aimed forces or an armed group and prohibiting their 
participation in hostilities are norms of customary international law.64 This is evidenced 
through the treaties and conventions mentioned above and their almost universal adoption 
and ratification by States. The prohibition can also be evidenced through resolutions and 
actions undertaken by States and organisations. 
At international conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, resolutions have 
been adopted prohibiting the recruitment of children and their paiticipation in hostilities. 
Fmthermore a plan of action adopted at the 27 th Conference requires state parties to take 
61 "War Crime Issues Before the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Cow1", above n 52. 
62 
Statute of the Special Court for Sieffa Leone, Article 4(c) www.sc-sl.org (accessed 23 September 2008). 
See also Alex Duval Smith "Charles Taylor's trial for murder, rape and slavery begins in Hague" (4 June 
2007) www.independent.co.uk (accessed 24 September 2008). 
63 
See Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Judgement) [1985] ICJ Rep 13 , 29 states 
that: " the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and 
opinio Juris of states." 
64 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005) 482 - 485 [ Customwy International Humanitarian Law]. 
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all measures including penal measures to stop the recmitment and paiticipation of 
children in aimed hostilities.
65 
The United Nations Security Council since 1999 has also taken action through 
resolutions condemning the recruitment of children and use of children in a11ned conflict 
in violation of international law.
66 The first of these demanded that through political and 
other efforts, states and all parts of the UN system ensure an end to the recruitment and 
use of children in a11ned conflict.
67 Since then through Resolution 1314 it has linked 
violations of the prohibition to it being able to use its powers under Chapter VII to 
undertake enforcement measures where there is a threat to international peace and 
security. 68 Resolution 1314 detennined that violations of international humanitaiian law 
such as recmiting child soldiers constitute a threat to the peace. Following from this 
authority it has taken action through more country specific resolutions such as demanding 
"an effective end to the recruitment, training and use of children" in aimed forces in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.
69 
The Organisation of African Unity through its Council of Ministers have also 
adopted resolutions affitming that "the use of children in aimed conflicts constitutes a 
violation of their rights and should be considered as wai· crimes" and waining state 
paities engaged in civil wai·s to "refrain from recruiting children." 
70 
These are only a few exainples of actions taken which evidence the prohibition on 
the recmitment and use of children in hostilities as a no1m in international customary law. 
There are many more as well as condemning statements from States and non-
governmental organisations such as Amnesty International, UNICEF the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights Watch where children have been used in 
65 27 th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Res I (adopted by consensus) (Geneva, 
31 October 1999 - 6 November 1999). 
66 UNSC Resolution 1261 (25 August 1999) S/RES/l 26 l /1999. 
67 Ibid , para 13. 
68 Charter of the United Nations (26 June I 945) 59 Stat 1031 , Art 39 www .un .org (accessed 24 September 
2008) . 
69 UNSC Resolution 1341 (22 February 2001) S/RES/1341 /2001, para 1 O. 
70 OAU Council of Ministers Resolution 1659 (1-5 July 1996) CM/Res 1659 (LXIV) Rev 1 1996. 
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armed conflict such as in Libetia and Sudan, Sti Lanka and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
For example in 1998 the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
aired a communication on the national radio calling for children and youth between 
twelve and twenty years old to enlist in the aimed forces. Following this, Human Rights 
Watch wrote a letter to the President and issued press statements condemning the 
recruitment of those under the age of 18 and calling for the demobilisation of those under 
this age already enlisted stating that: "international law prohibits the recruitment of any 
children under the age of 15, and an international consensus is building on behalf of 
prohibitions on any military recruitment below the age of 18."71 A recent United Nations 
Security Council statement condemning the use of child soldiers and calling upon all 
parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under international law was 
used to back up this asse11ion.72 
Fu11hermore states and non-governmental organisations continue to collaborate to 
put an end to the unlawful recruitment and use of children in aimed conflict. In 2007 the 
Paris conference, hosted by the Government of France and UNICEF, brought together 
countries affected by the use of child soldiers as well as donor nations to tackle the 
recruitment of children and to hainess the political will to confront it. At the conference, 
the Paiis Principles were unveiled detailing a set of guidelines for protecting children 
from recruitment and for providing effective assistance to those already involved with 
armed groups or forces. Following the Conference UNICEF's deputy executive director 
recognised that: 73 
what this conference has shown is that there is a great deal of political commitment to ending 
the unlawful recruitment of children ... We are very excited to see so much political 
commitment to tackling this issue. We know it is a long road ahead of us and it will require 
71 Human Rights Watch "HRW Condemns Recruitment of Child Soldiers in Congo" (11 August 1998) 
Human Rights News New York www.hrw.org (accessed 24 September 2008). 
72 UNSC "Children and Aimed Conflict" (29 June 1998) Presidential Statement S/PRST/ 1998/18. 
73 UNICEF "Paris conference on child soldiers concludes with commitment to stop the recruitment of 
children" (6 February 2007) Press Release www.unicef.org (accessed 24 September 2008). 
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long-tenn commitment and suppo11. But we truly hope this marks the beginning of the end 
for the use of children in warfare. 
Continuous action unde11aken by organisations and states to put an end to the use 
of child soldiers and encouraging their demobilisation and reintegration back into society 
are also evidence of an established customary nonn. 
The only problem with this norm is that there is not yet a uniform practice 
regarding the minimum age for recruitment and pai1icipation in hostilities.
74 
This is 
evident through the vaiiations ainongst the international treaties and conventions. 
However a rule of customary international law can still be found if state practice is 
vi11ually unifonn. 75 It is safe to say that there is virtually uniform state practice and 
agreement that the age of recruitment and pai1icipation in hostilities should not be below 
15. However for the protection of children aged between 15-18 years under customaiy 
international law remains uncertain. 
E The Sam Hinga Norman Decision 76 
More recent evidence of this international customary nonn is its inclusion in the 
Statute for the Special Cou11 for Sieffa Leone (SCSL) which under Article 4 has the 
power to prosecute for conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into 
anned forces or groups or using them to pai1icipate actively in hostilities.
77 Several of the 
leaders of the armed forces in the conflict in Sieffa Leone have been charged under this 
provision.78 
However one of those indicted , the now deceased Sain Hinga Norman, challenged 
the Cow1's jurisdiction to tJy him. His alleged unlawful recruitment of children occuITed 
in 1996 before the Rome Statute had recognised the recruitment of children under the age 
74 Customwy International Humanitarian La lV, above n 64, 485-488 . 
15 North Sea Contin ental Sh elf cases (Judgement) [ 1969] ICJ Rep 3, 43. 
76 Th e Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Nonnan (Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction 
(Child Recruitment)) (31 May 2004) SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) (Appeals Chamber, SCSL). 
77 Statute of the Special Cou11 for Sierra Leone, above n 62, a114(c). 
78 For example Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao alleged Leaders and Commanders of 
the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone were all indicted for the use of child soldiers www.sc-
sl.org (accessed 30 September 2008). 
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of 15 in hostilities as a war crime. Based on the principles of nu Liem crimen sine fege and 
nufla poena sine /ege 79 his argument was that in 1996 child recrnitment had not yet 
crystallised as a crime under customary international law, so he could therefore not be 
punished. Although as illustrated above, the prohibition against the recruitment and 
paiticipation of children in hostilities may have been an established customary norm, it is 
arguable whether this nonn had been criminalised under customary international law 
predating its inclusion in the Rome Statute. 
The dissenting Judge, Robertson J, believed there was insufficient evidence of 
state practice and opinio Juris to imply customary criminalisation. No matter how 
abhoITent or grotesque we may consider ones conduct it alone is no basis for att1ibuting 
individual criminal responsibility. Instead what one needs is: 80 
The clear and unequivocal recognition of the rules of warfare in international law and State 
practice indicating an intention to criminalise the prohibition, including statements by 
government officials and international organisations, as well as punishment of violations by 
national courts and military tribunals . 
Although international instruments such as the CRC Optional Protocol 
encouraged criminalisation, only 5 States could be cited as having specific criminal law 
against child recrnitment before its inclusion in the Rome Statute.81 The Geneva 
Conventions and their Optional Protocols, the CRC and the Afiican Charter only 
demonstrate "a predisposition in the international community to suppo11 a new offence of 
non-forcible recrnitment of children, at least for front-line fighting." 82 Furthermore there 
79 This maxim against retroactive criminal prosecution is set out in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 , art 15 states : No-one should be held guilty of any 
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under 
national or international law, at the time when it was committed . 
80 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Decsion on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (2 
October 1995) IT-94-I-AR72 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY) para 128 . 
81 Th e Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Nonnan (Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jw·isdiction 
(Child Recruitment)) (31 May 2004) SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) (Appeals Chamber, SCSL) dissenting 
opinion of Justice Robe11son , para 40. 
82 Ibid , para 34 . 
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was no evidence of any prosecution being brought for child recruitment prior to this 
case.83 
Based on this , Robe1tson J concluded that the recruitment of children was not a 
cnme under customary international law in 1996. All that had emerged was a 
humanitarian mle that obliged states, and anned factions within states, to avoid enlisting 
children under 15 or involving them in hostilities, whether arising from international or 
internal conflict. The offence cognizable by international criminal law which pennitted 
the t1ial and punishment of individuals only arose with the enactment of the Rome 
Statute.84 
The majority on the other hand focused on the CRC provisions which embody the 
international nonns established by Additional Protocol I and II of the Geneva 
Conventions. On the basis of A1ticle 38 and the fact that at the time all but 6 states in the 
world had ratified the CRC, the majo1ity concluded too that prohibition had in fact 
"crystallized as customary international law."
85 However they went further than 
Robe1tson by looking to the mle as "protecting fundamental values"
86 and using the 
Optional Protocol which required state patties to c1iminalise child recruitment to the CRC 
as evidence to conclude that violation of the prohibition in 1996 could in fact constitute a 
criminal offence capable of individual responsibility under international law.
87 
The majority caine to this conclusion despite Robe1tson I's firm belief that the 
addition of child recruitment as a war crime was not a consolidation of existing 
customa1y law. 88 Williain Schab as, a leading expert on the Rome treaty, also describes 
the provision as "consisting of new law."
89 Even the Secretaiy-General of the United 
83 fbid , para 22. 
84 
Ibid , para 33 . 
85 The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Nonnan , above n 76, para 17. 
86 Ibid , para 39 . 
87 Ibid , para 36 . 
88 Th e Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Nomian dissenting opinion of Justice Robe1iSon , above n 81 , para 39 . 
89 An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, above n 54 , 49. 
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Nations in his report on the draft SCSL Statute commented that the Rome Statute 
provision had a doubtful customary nature, stating that: 90 
while the prohibition on child recruitment has by now acquired a customary international law 
status, it is far less clear whether it is customarily recognised as a war crime entailing the 
individual responsibility of the accused. 
This statement was in explanation of his decision to include the naiTower offence 
of 'abduction and forced recruitment of children' in the draft SCSL statute. This 
proposition was rejected by the President of the Security Council with preference given 
instead to the wider offence of 'conscription' and 'enlistment' so as to "conform to the 
statement of law existing in 1996 and as cwTently accepted in the international 
community."91 What is interesting however, as pointed out by Robertson J, is that there is 
no authority for the proposition that the law in 1996 criminalised individuals who 
'enlisted' child volunteers as distinct from forcibly consc1ipting them or using them to 
paiticipate actively in hostilities.92 This lack of authority is evident from the above 
analysis of international humanitarian and human law and the clear absence of the term 
'enlistment' in the provisions dealing with child recruitment. 
It is in this author's opinion that Robertson J has a strong ai·gument and it is 
difficult to see how the prohibition could have crystallized as a crime under customary 
international law. However to this date there have been no challenges to the Norman 
decision of SCSL Appeals Chamber and the majo1ity's finding still stands. 
F Children Primarily Victims 
Whether the majo1ity or Robertson J was coITect in their approach in the Norman 
decision, nonetheless we can be sure that the prohibition of recrnitment and use of 
children in hostilities is a well established nonn under customa1y international law. We 
can also be sure that after 1998, for states that are a paity to the Rome Statute, the 
9° Kofi Annan "Repor1 of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone" 
( 4 October 2000) UN Doc S/2000/915 , para I ?["Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a 
Special Cowt for Sierra Leone"]. 
9 1 Letter from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (22 December 
2000) S/2000/1234, para 3. 
92 Th e Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Naiman , dissenting opinion of Justice Robertson, above n 81 , para 5. 
23 
recmitment and use of children in hostilities is also a crime which will attract individual 
c1iminal responsibility. 
What is important to note 1s that Sam Hinga Nornrnn was charged for the 
recmitment and use of children under the doctrine of command responsibility. 9
3 This 
doctrine attributes individual c1iminal responsibility to commanders for crimes 
"committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such forces,"94 and for c1imes "committed by subordinates under 
his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such subordinates."95 
Although st1ictly speaking the doctrine does not operate to the exclusion of other 
bases of criminal responsibility, it is submitted that the effect of prosecuting those 
responsible for recmitment is that is that international law subsequently treats those 
children who are subject to unlawful recmitment as not responsible for their actions. 
Instead they are treated as victims, "victims of adults aiming children."96 As put by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu:97 
We must not close our eyes to the fact that child soldiers are both victims and perpetrators. 
They sometimes ca1Ty out the most barbaric acts of violence. But no matter what the child is 
guilty of, the main responsibility lies with us , the adults. There is simply no excuse, no 
acceptable argument for am1ing children. 
International law therefore through conventions, treaties and practice prohibits 
and criminalises the recmitment and use of children in hostilities, and treats child soldiers 
p1imarily as victims. 
93 
Statute of the Special Cou11 for Siena eone, above n 62, a114. See al o Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Cou11, above n 51, a1128. 
94 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, above n 51 , a1128(a). 
95 Ibid , a11 28(b ). 
96 Veronica Beatriz Pinero "The Challenges of Reconstruction and Reconciliation Following an Armed 
Conflict" (2004) I Eyes on the ICC 30, 36. 
97 
Archbishop D. Tutu, No Peace Without Fo,giveness (New York , Random House 1999). 
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IV CHILDREN ARE NOT ONLY VICTIMS - RECOGNISING A DUEL 
IDENTITY 
Recognising child soldiers as victims in these situations also aligns with common 
law negative fault principles of involunta1y intoxication98 and duress. 99 It is a harsh 
reality that child soldiers are commonly subjected to duress and as mentioned earlier, 
drugs are used to further loosen their inhibitions in order to carry out crimes with little 
fear and revulsion and greater enthusiasm. 100 Children under the influence of drugs 
should not be individually responsible for their actions as they are unable to appreciate 
the unlawfulness of their acts or control their conduct. Individual responsibility should 
also not attach in circumstances where acts are committed as a result of a threat of death 
or imminent serious bodily harm. These principles of involuntary intoxication and duress 
are also recognised in international law in the Rome Statute under grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility. 10 1 
However the problem with the analysis of the international law so far is that it 
ignores the situations where child soldiers have committed acts voluntarily without the 
influence of drugs or duress. Therefore by classifying them as victims subjected to harsh 
treatment and human 1ights violations, the international community often fails to take 
into account the fact that child soldiers are also the perpetrators of heinous acts and 
atrocities in times of aimed conflict. 
As reported by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sien-a Leone, child 
perpetrators canied out many of the same human rights violations to which they 
themselves had been subjected. These included killing, abduction, amputation, 
mutilation, exto1tion, looting and destmction, rape and sexual violence, abduction and 
98 See Andrew Ashwo1th Principles of Criminal Law (5 ed, Oxford University Press, New York , 2006) 
2 11-228 [Princip les of Criminal Law] in certain circumstances a state of intoxication may negate the mens 
rea requirement for the commission ofa crime. 
99 Charles Greenbaum, Philip Veemian and Naomj Bacon-Shnoor (eds) Protection of Children During 
Anned Conflict: A Multi Discip/in(l}y Perspective (Intersentia, Oxford, 2006) 318. See also Amnesty 
International "Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims?" Al lndex: [OR 50/02/00 (December 2000) 6. 
100 Child Soldiers: Th e Role of Children in Aimed Conflict, above n 8. 
101 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, above n 51 , ai1 31. 
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forced recrnitment, forced displacement, forced detention, assault, torture, beating and 
forced labour. 102 
These acts were not just can-ied out against opposition forces but were also 
inflicted upon the civilian population in SielTa Leone. How can we ignore these acts 
which would not only be considered to constitute 'grave breaches' 103 under the Geneva 
Conventions but also 'war crimes' 104 as set out in the Rome Statute? Once within a 
military environment child soldiers make a switch from victim to perpetrator, taking on a 
complex duel identity. 105 
V HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW DEALS WITH CHILD SOLDIERS AS 
PERPETRATORS 
A Treaties and Conventions 
International law does not directly address the issue of whether child soldiers 
themselves should face prosecution for atrocities. Under the Rome State the International 
Criminal Com1 has no jurisdiction to prosecute persons below the age of 18. 106 In the 
Special Com1s set up for Yugoslavia and Rwanda there is no mention of age, therefore 
the possibility of prosecuting those under the age of 18 has not been rnled out. The SCSL 
on the other hand has specified that accused persons who are between the ages of 15 and 
18 at the time of commission of crimes may be prosecuted. 107 The prosecutor however 
has publicly stated on numerous occasions he will not prosecute under 18s as they do not 
102 Th e Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone Volum e 3b, Chapter 4: 
Children and the A11ned Conflict in Sierra Leone, above n 9 , para 228. 
103 For grave breaches ee Geneva Convention I, above n 17, a11 14 7. 
104 For list of war crimes see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, above n 51, art 8. 
105 See "Report of the Secretary General on the establishment of a Special Cowt for SielTa Leone" above n 
90 , para 32. See also Th e Final Report of th e Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone Volum e 
3b, Chapter 4: Children and the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone, above n 9 , para 225 . 
106 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, above n 51 , a11 26 . 
107 Statute of the Special Court for SierTa Leone, above n 62 , art 7 . 
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meet the competence to prosecute 'those who bear the greatest responsibility' for crimes 
within the Comt's jurisdiction. 108 
International legal instruments also do not specify an age below which children 
cannot incur criminal responsibility. Age is an important factor because only those who 
are old enough to understand and appreciate the significance of their behaviour may be 
held criminally responsible. 109 The CRC recommends the age of 18 but only binds states 
which are party to the convention to establish "a minimum age below which children 
shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law." 110 As the age for 
criminal responsibility varies across many jurisdictions, it creates tension it creates 
tension when dealing with fixing an age at which international criminal responsibility 
attaches. 
B An International Prohibition on the Prosecution of Children for International 
Crimes? 
Reis has suggested, using Rwandan law and the crime of genocide to illustrate, 
that there exists an international prohibition on the prosecution of children for 
international crimes. 111 Atticle 40(2) of the CRC states that "no child shall be alleged as, 
be accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal law by reasons of acts or 
omissions that were not prohibited by national or international law at the time they were 
committed." 112 A similar provision is contained in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in A1ticle 15( I ). 113 For Reis the existence of an age of 
c1iminal responsibility of 14 years in Rwanda fulfils the crite1ia of "acts not prohibited" 
108 Special Couri for Sien·a Leone Public Affairs Office "Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not 
Prosecute Children" (2 November 2002) Press Release. 
109 Christina Clark "Juvenile Justice and Child Soldiering: Trends, Challenges, Dilemmas" in Charles 
Greenbaum, Philip Veem1an and Naomi Bacon-Shnoor (eds) Protection of Children During Armed 
Conflict: A Multi Disciplina,y Perspective (Intersentia, Ox ford , 2006) 313 [Protection of Children During 
Anned Conflict: A Multi Disciplina,y Perspective]. 
11° Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25, ari 40(3Xa). 
111 
Chen Reis "Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children for 
Participation in Internal Armed Conflict" (1997) 28 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 629,643 
["Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children for Pariicipation in 
lntemal A1111ed Conflict"]. 
11 2 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25, a1i 40(2). 
11 3 
international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, ari 15. 
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on a national level. 114 However the counter argument to this is Altic le 15(2) of the 
ICCPR which states that: "nothing in this aiticle shall prejudice the trial and punishment 
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations." 
115 
Therefore an act such as genocide, any other c1ime against humanity or a war c1ime 
would fit into this definition preventing the ex post facto law argument coming into play 
and allowing a child soldier who has canied out such an act to be prosecuted.
116 
Reis also argues that offences such as genocide are recognised internationally as 
exempting children because they are incapable of conceptualising such complex fonns of 
intent. 11 7 However, as pointed out by another author there seems to be no justification for 
reading an age requirement into the threshold for such an offence.
118 If anything, the 
provisions of the CRC point against a general prohibition against prosecuting children by 
setting out standards of juvenile justice which must be adhered to if a child is accused of 
or recognised as having infringed the penal law. 
119 State practice has moved from 
presumptions of deeming children as incapable of forming the requisite intent for an 
offence to treating them more like adult offenders when serious c1imes are committed.
120 
In light of this and a lack of specific treaty based provisions and resolutions on the 
matter, it is difficult to establish that Reis's claim of a customary n01m prohibiting the 
prosecution of children for international crimes exits. 
114 See "Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children for Participation in 
Internal Armed Conflict", above n 111 ,643. 
11 5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , above n 113 , art 15. 
116 John R Morss "The Status of Child Offenders under International Criminal Justice: Lessons from SierTa 
Leone" 9 (2004) Deakin Law Review 213,218 ["The Status ofChild Offenders under International 
Criminal Justice: Lessons from Sierra Leone"]. 
117 "Trying the future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children for Participation in 
Internal Anned Conflict", above n 111 , 645 . 
118 
"The Status of Child Offenders under International Criminal Justice: Lessons from Sierra Leone", above 
n 116,219. 
11 9 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25, art 40 . 
120 "The Status of Child Offenders under International Criminal Justice: Lessons from Sierra Leone" , above 
n 106,2 19 . 
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C Customary Prohibition on Capital Punishment for Children 
Although there is no prohibition on the prosecution of children in international 
law there does exist a prohibition on the capital punishment of children under the age of 
18. The first international instrument to recognise the condemnation of juvenile 
executions was Geneva Convention IV which under Article 68(4) prohibits the execution 
of persons for crimes committed while under the age of 18, to the extent that the offender 
is a 'protected person.' 121 This provision followed the penal code of many countries and 
was based on the idea that "a person who has not reached the age of 18 years is not fully 
capable of sound judgement, does not always realise the significance of his actions and 
often acts under the influence of others, if not under constraint." 122 
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions widened the scope of the 
prohibition by extending it further than protected persons. Article 77(5) of Additional 
Protocol I states that the death penalty for an offence relating to armed conflict shall not 
be executed on persons who have not attained the age of 18 years at the time the offence 
was committed. 123 According to the commentary to this a11icle the provision effectively 
ruled out completely the death penalty for persons under 18 years of age. 124 Additional 
Protocol II extends this prohibition to non-international aimed conflict. 125 
The ICCPR also states in Al1icle 6(5) that the "sentence of death shall not be 
imposed for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age." 126 However this 
covenant was either not ratified by aJI states or states such as the United States had 
ratified the covenant with a reservation to this particular a11icle. The United States view 
at this time was that international law did not prohibit the execution of those committing 
capital crimes under the age of 18 years provided due process guarantees were provided. 
121 Geneva Convention IV, above n 17 , art 68(4). 
122 0.M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Commenta,y, IV, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958) 346. 
123 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (8 June 1977) I 125 UNTS 3, Art 77(5). 
124 C Pilloud and J Pictet "Article 77 - Protection of Children" in Y Sandoz et al., Commenta,y on th e 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to th e Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martin us Nijhoff 
Publishers, Geneva , 1987) 904. 
125 Additional Protocol II to d1e Geneva Conventions, above n 22, art 6(4 ). 
126 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25, art 6(5). 
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They believed that there was insufficient evidence of state practice and opinio .Juris for it 
b f . . l l 121 to e a nonn o mtemationa customary aw. 
However the CRC changed many states position with regards to juvenile 
executions and since its entry into international law there has been a growing acceptance 
of the proposition that the prohibition is a norn1 of customaiy international law. A11icle 
37(a) states that:" ... Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility 
of release shall be imposed for offences committed by the persons below 18 years of 
age ... " 128 Since the CRC other soft law instrnments such as Safeguards Guaranteeing the 
Rjghts of those Facing the Death Penalty and the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice 1985 (the 'Beijing Rules') have also banned capital 
punishment for those under the age of 18. 129 
When the CRC entered into force there were about 10 countries that still caITied 
out juvenile executions but this number shrank to just one, the United States who still to 
this day has not ratified the CRC. However in the 2005 case of Roper v Simmons 13
0 a 5-4 
majority in the Supreme Court prohibited the imposition of capital punishment for crimes 
committed by those under the age of 18. After exainining the differences between 
juvenile and adult offenders it was stated that "the susceptibility of juveniles to immature 
and iITesponsible behaviour means their inesponsible conduct is not as morally 
' 
reprehensible as that of an adult." 131 Therefore because of this diminished capacity the 
justifications of retribution and deteITence applied with lesser force to juveniles then 
adults justifying a prohibition of capital punishment for their crimes. 132 
127 
UN Commission on Human Rights "Report of the Special Rappotteur on Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions" (1990) (E/CN.4/1990/22 , para 431. 
128 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25 , a1t 37(a). 
129 
See Safeguards Guaranteeing the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty ECOSOC Resolution 
1984/50 (25 May 1984) A1t 3; See also Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice 
("The Beijing Rules") UNGA Resolution 40/33 (29 November 1985) A/RES/40/33, rule 17 .2. 
130 Roper v Simmons (2005)543 US 551. · 
131 Ibid, 17. 
132 Ibid. 
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The case is significant as it can now be safe to say that the prohibition against 
capital punishment for those under the age of 18 is now a rule of customary international 
law with sufficient state practice and opinio Juris to back it up. 133 For the purposes of this 
paper although such a norm does not outright support the prosecution of child soldiers, it 
is still evidence that there is no prohibition against not prosecuting them under 
international law. If a customary norm has had to be established regarding the extent of a 
child's punishment under the penal law, it must follow that it is possible to prosecute 
them in the first place. 
However the only problem is that with the exception of the Statute of the SCSL 
there is nothing in international law which expressly allows for the prosecution of those 
under the age of 18. Rather the anay of international law discussed above and in chapter 
III produces a gap between the minimum age for recruitment and the minimum age for 
which we tend to attribute criminal responsibility. Thus even when dealing with children 
as perpetrators, international law still appears to treat them as victims by allowing for this 
lacuna in the attribution of criminal responsibility to occur. 
VI ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL - IMPUNITY UNDESIRABLE 
Whilst we might be more apt to recognise children below the age of 15 as victims, 
the flaw with the above approach is that it effectively treats all child soldiers alike placing 
a blanket immunity on accountability for their actions by means of only prosecuting those 
commanders responsible for their recruitment, and use in hostilities. International law 
ignores child soldiers aged between 15 and 18 and does not take into account the 
instances where those children have clearly been in control of their actions, and not 
133 William Schaba "The Rights of the Child, Law of Armed Conflict and Customary lnternational Law: A 
Tale of Two Cases" in Karin Arts and Vessel in Popovski (eds) international Criminal Accountability and 
the Rights of Children, above n 13 , 35. 
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drugged or forced into committing atrocities but rather have become soldiers voluntarily 
d . d · · l 134 an comm1tte atrocities vo untaiy. 
There are several reasons why we should not grant impunity to all child soldiers. 
Firstly it has been argued that forgoing prosecution permits and encourages the continued 
recruitment of child soldiers. 135 It has also been argued that if perpetrators believe they 
can get away with committing atrocities then there is little incentive to stop, eventually 
leading to a spiral of violence especially if there are gains to be made in the process. 136 
Amnesty International has a strong stance in the matter believing that those who have 
committed se1ious atrocities will continue to do so knowing the matter will not be 
investigated and they will not be held accountable. In their eyes it is impo1tant to set an 
example for others. 137 
There is also the factor that 1gnonng atrocities committed by children could 
undennine the wider administration of justice, and the scope for justice systems to 
maintain credibility. 138 Following from this is the fact that granting impunity denies 
victims a 1ight to reparation including a right to an apology and a right to justice. 139 
The final problem to consider is command responsibility and the question of what 
happens to the doctrine when the person who controls the child soldier is a child 
themselves? 140 How can we ignore the children who incite others to commit serious 
atrocities, surely they should be held accountable to some degree? As mentioned earlier 
international law does have the means to hold these children accountable through juvenile 
justice standards contained in the CRC and other soft law instruments. 
134 Amnesty International "Child Soldiers : Criminals or Victims?" AI Index: IOR 50/02/00 (December 
2000) 2 ["Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims?"]. 
135 Ibid, 3 . 
136 A. Mawson , Children, Impunity and Ju stice: Some Dilemmas from Northern Uganda, presentation to 
the Conference on 'Children in Extreme Circumstances' (London, London School of Economics 27 
November 1998). 
137 "Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims?" above n 134, 3. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 W . McCamey "Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims: Should Child Soldiers Be Prosecuted for Crimes 
Against Humanity'' Paper presented to the Child and War Conference (Sion , Switzerland, International 
Institute for the Rights of the Chi Id 200 l) 7. 
32 
VII JUVENILLE JUSTICE 
Under first principles of the criminal law to be guilty of a crime there must be the 
requisite mens rea as well as the actus reus. 141 Because of a child's evolving mental and 
moral state there is a presumption of doli incapax (being deemed incapable of 
committing a crime) for those between the age of 10 and 14. 142 This can be rebutted if the 
prosecution can prove a "mischievous discretion" which is the capacity of a child to 
differentiate between right and wrong. 143 
Placing a gun in a child's hand to fight against opposition armed forces is one 
thing, asking them to spy is another, however in both situations we may still regard these 
children as victims of adults aiming children and therefore not responsible. But when 
these children voluntarily carry out atrocities such as killing, mutilation, rape and sexual 
violence against the civilian population they become perpetrators. Returning to the 
rebuttable doli incapax p1inciple in the context of these child soldiers they ai·guably have 
more control over these actions and the ability to differentiate between right and wrong. 
By only applying to children between the ages of 10 and 14 the presumption also favours 
an argument for child soldiers above this age being deemed capable of criminal 
responsibility for their actions in times of anned conflict. 
In the United Kingdom the presumption has been abolished by statute as it is seen 
by judges and politicians as an indulgence incompatible with an effective response to 
juvenile offending. 144 Instead the trend in national jurisdictions over time has been to see 
children and youth being held accountable for their actions but within a regime 
specifically catered to their needs and vulnerabilities . This idea is embodied in aiticle 
14(4) of the ICCPR which states that in the case of criminal charges against juvenile 
141 Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law, above n 98 , 95 ; see also AP Simester and GR Sullivan 
Criminal Law Theo, y and Doctrine (3 ed , Hart Publi hing, Oregon, 2007) 6. 
142 AP Simester and GR Sullivan Criminal Law Th eo,y and Doctrine (3 ed, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2007) 
663. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid , 664 . 
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persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability 
of promoting their rehabilitation. 145 
The CRC acts as a guiding tool in this process by setting out standards of juvenile 
justice which state pai1ies ai·e obliged to follow. 146 There ai·e also non binding 
recommendations regai·ding juvenile justice in the fo1m of the Beijing Rules (mentioned 
eai·Jier in regards to capital punishment) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection 
of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty 1990. 147 Justice does not mean imprisonment. In 
the case of juvenile justice this is only one of many outcomes that may occur. All three 
instruments have rehabilitative underpinnings with the key considerations being the 'best 
interests' 148 and 'well-being' 149 of the child. In many cases these considerations will be 
interpreted as infonnal approaches to justice and national reconciliation such as 
community based initiatives or refe1i-al to social services rather than fo1mal criminal trial. 
In New Zealand we see this reflected in the use of the Fainily Group Conference 
(FGC). Although the age for criminal responsibility is 10, children under the age of 14 
cannot be prosecuted except for the offences of murder or manslaughter. 150 The 
alternative therefore is to deal with these children by means of a warning, Police 
diversion or an FGC. 151 The FGC process enables victims, offenders and their fainilies to 
confront issues of responsibility, the causes of offending and also decide how an offence 
should be resolved in an informal non-adversarial environment. 152 It also provides a 
mechanism through which an offender can apologise and express 1;emorse to their victim. 
It is also available to those under the age of 16, however for those 16 and above, offences 
are dealt with in the saine manner as adults in the District or High Court. 153 
145 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , above n 113, art 14(4 ). 
146 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25 , art 40. 
147 
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, UNGA Resolution 
45/113 (14 December 1999) A/RES/45 /113. 
148 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25 , ari 3 . 
149 
See Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules") UNGA 
Resolution 40/33 (29 November 1985) A/RES /40/33 , rule 1. I . 
150 See Crimes Act 1961 , ss 21-22. 
151 Ministry of Justice www.justice.govt.nz (accessed 12 August 2000). 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
34 
The Beijing rules also anticipate that just desert and retributive sanctions may be 
appropriate where a juvenile has committed a serious offence. 154 Where there is grave 
c1iminal responsibility it is argued "that it is in the child's 'best interests' to be called to 
account for his or her acts, and the consequences of those acts through a child-orientated 
c1iminal process under international law. 155 
Such a proposition is suppo11ed by the fact that in national jurisdictions such as 
New Zealand the serious offences of manslaughter and murder committed by a young 
person above the age of l O are dealt with by the High Cou11 in the same manner as an 
adult. Furthermore those above the age of 16 are dealt with as if they were an adult. In 
support of dealing with child soldiers as victims commentators commonly refer to the 
idea of indoctiination. 156 The fact that these children know no better, that they have been 
taught and grown to accustomed to the ways of the rebel groups of armed forces they are 
recruited to fight for. It is said that young children who join the fighting no longer 
recognise right from wrong and what they go through is in effect a process of 
asocialization where the standards of behaviour are determined by the possession of 
weapons and the ability to maintain power over others by threatening them with death. 157 
Children are raised to follow instructions, their vulnerability as noted earlier making it 
easier them to be controlled and manipulated by fellow soldiers and commanders. 158 
However it may be said that indoctrination of young children suppo11s the 
argument of attributing c1iminal responsibility for their acts. Researchers found amongst 
a sample of Mozambican boys that the length of time spent in base camps affected the 
children's capacity to act upon traditional concepts of right and wrong. 159 For children 
who spent one to two years or more in base camps, it was only after three months in a 
154 See Standard Minimwn Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules") UNGA 
Resolution 40/33 (29 November 1985) A/RES/40/33, a11 17 commentary. 
155 Protection of Children During Armed Conflict: A Multi Disciplina,y Perspective, above n 119, 317 . 
156 See Child Soldiers: Th e Role of Children in Anned Conflict, above n 8, 27. 
157 "Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children for Pa11icipation in 
Internal Arn1ed Conflict", above n 111,645. 
158 Matthew Happold "The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes under International 
Law" in International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children, above n 13, 70. 
159 Child Soldiers: Th e Role of Children in Aimed Conflict, above n 8, 110. 
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rehabilitation centre that they began to show any remorse for previous acts of violence or 
anxiety in regards to their acts. 160 If children who have committed atrocities do not go 
through some so11 of process of c1iminal accountability they may never return to these 
traditional concepts ofright and wrong. 
In national jurisdiction factors such as circumstances smTounding the crime and a 
child's upb1inging come into account in the mitigation of sentencing. It will never 
prevent the prosecution for a criminal charge from going ahead. Consider the situation of 
New Zealand's youngest convicted killer. Bailey Junior Kurariki was just 12 at the time 
of the killing of a pizza delivery worker but he received a sentence of seven years 
imprisonment for the manslaughter. He was one of six youths all below the age of 18 
who were convicted for the same crime. At the time the crime was committed Kurariki 
was on the run from a home he had been placed in by Child Youth and Family. As he had 
been suspended from school in 1999 during his standard four year and given a non-
molestation order he was prevented from attending intennediate schools because all the 
principals blacklisted him. His criminal behaviour had started from at least three years 
before the attack and he was known to the police from the age of 9 for petty ciimes.
161 
From a background of poverty and violence the Children's Commissioner at the 
time said the boy's background vi11ually sentenced him to a life of crime.
162 Pove11Y, 
violence, separation from family and lack of schooling are conditions which are 
associated with the case of child soldiers and background excuses which are used for 
treating them as victims in the context of aimed conflict. With no school, no family, 
Kurariki 's choice of a life of crime could be said to just as much a forced choice as in the 
case of some child soldiers. However these same factors did not prevent Kurariki 
escaping c1iminal responsibility. Such an approach makes the blanket immunity for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity given to child soldiers between the ages of 15 to 18 
years under international law questionable. 
160 Ibid. 
161 One News "Spotllight on Care ofYoung Killer" (12 September 2002) www.tvnz.co.nz (accessed 25 
September 2008). See also One News "Young Killer "Fell Through Cracks" (25 August 2002) 
www.tvnz.co.nz (accessed 25 September 2008). 
162 Ibid. 
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Even if one does not agree with retributive sanctions for child solders, the Beijing 
Rules guiding principles to adjudication and disposition imply that strictly punitive 
approaches are not always appropriate and not the only option especially in juvenile cases 
where such considerations should always be outweighed by the interest of safeguarding 
the well-being and the future of the young person. 163 The rules encourage the use of 
alternatives to institutionalization to the maximum extent possible, the commentary 
stating that: "full use should be made of the range of existing alternative sanctions and 
new alternative sanctions should be developed, bearing the public safety in mind." 164 This 
supp011s the case that when dealing with child soldiers a process of accountability can be 
supplemented by sanctions that incorporate rehabilitation. The two can work together, 
rather than in isolation to help restore a child's moral sense of right and wrong. 
As seen above the appropriate mechanisms already exist in the international legal 
realm for bringing child soldiers to justice whilst taking into account their duel victim 
perpetrator identity. Encouraging att1ibuting c1iminal responsibility to child soldiers does 
not mean fo1mal criminal trial following imprisonment as with their adult counterparts in 
specialised tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It is 
suggested that given the extreme nature of the crimes under consideration, measures that 
foster respect for the rights of others are crncial not only to the child's rehabilitation, but 
to that of the entire community, and for the prevention of future violence. 165 This idea is 
reinforced by Article 40( 1) of the CRC which states that children who have infringed the 
penal law need to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's 
sense of dignity and w011h whilst reinforcing "the child's respect for the human 1ights 
and fundamental freedom of others". 166 
This holistic perspective of looking not only to the child but to the victim of the 
c1ime as well as the wider community is commonly refen-ed to as taking a restorative 
163 See Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ('The Beijing Rules") UNGA 
Resolution 40/33 (29 November 1985) A/RES/40/33 , a11 17 commentary. 
164 
Ibid. 
165 Protection of Children During Armed Conflict: A Multi Discip/ina,y Perspective, above n 109, 318. 
166 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25, art 40(1 ). 
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justice approach. It is submitted that it is this approach which must be used to deal with 
child soldiers who have been the perpetrators of atrocities dming a time of armed 
conflict. 
VIII RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Restorative justice is not easily defined because it encompasses a vatiety of 
practices at different stages of the criminal process, including diversion from comt 
prosecution, actions taken in pai·allel with comt decisions and meetings between victims 
and offenders at any stage of the criminal process. 
167 However one common element 
between any restorative justice approach undertaken is that it seeks to take into account 
all stakeholders to a crime. 168 This usually involves an emphasis on the role and 
experience of the victim in the criminal process, involvement of all the relevant patties to 
discuss the offence, its impact and what should be done to 'repair the harm'. Decision 
making is then ca1Tied out by both the stakeholders and any relevant legal actors. 
169 
There is a common misconception that taking such an approach is the opposite to 
a retributive justice approach and that the two can not work together. Retributive justice 
is often characterised by a focus on punishing a defendant through an adversarial process 
conducted by the state as opposed to repairing the hatm as envisaged by a restorative 
approach. 170 However Daly puts forward the proposition that in fact the two approaches 
are dependent on one another and that retributive censure sometimes needs to occur 
before reparative gestures can take place to repair the harm.
171 With regards to child 
soldiers, communities may be unwilling to reintegrate an offender back into the 
167 Kathleen Daly (2002) "Restorative Justice: The Real Story" in Declan Roche (ed) Restorative Justice 
(Dartmouth Publishing Company/Ashgate Publishing Limited , England, 2003) 87 ["Restorative Justice: 
The Real Story"]. 
168 Godfrey Musi la "Challenges in Establishing the Accountability of Child Soldiers" (2005) 5 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 321 , 325 ["Challenges in Establishing the Accountability of Child Soldiers"]. 
169 "Restorative Justice: The Real Story", above n 167, 88. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid, 90. 
38 
community or attempt to repair the harm until they have seen some form of censure take 
place. 
After the Rwandan Genocide surveys indicated that communities believed that 
children were culpable and must be punished to ensure accountability and adherence to 
the established social order. 172 They also believed that the children had voluntarily 
committed acts of violence, and that anyone with enough strength to commit the crimes 
should be treated as an adult. A conference was held to examine the aftermath and decide 
on a national policy to deal with participants in the massacre. Children were detained in 
order to address the fears of revenge and the possible reoccurrence of genocide. It was 
thought that if they were released there was a possibility of families of the victims 
seeking vigilante justice. 173 
At the conference the idea of a general amnesty for child soldiers was rejected and 
instead a scheme was recommended which involved the categorizing of crimes according 
to severity and culpability. This scheme would operate to determine who should be 
punished and what punishment they should receive, thus distinguishing between the 
planners of genocide and those who were drawn into it. From this recommendation the 
traditional gacaca court system was adjusted whereby under the Organic law offenders 
were classified into four categories and punished accordingly with input from the 
community. 174 The categories ranged from Category 1 being offenders of the most 
serious crimes to category 4 being those who committed offences against property. 175 
Suspects in categories 1 to 3 have the opportunity to confess, and if they do they gain the 
benefit of a reduced sentence. Punishment of category 4 offenders involves the paying of 
172 Save the Children Fund Children, Genocide and Justice (Save the Children USA, Kigali , 1995) 3. 
173 'Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children for Pa11icipation in 
Internal Anned Conflict", above n 111 ,633. 
174 "Challenges in Establishing the Accountability of Child Soldiers", above n 168 ,333. See also Nancy 
Amoury Combs Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law: Constructing a Restorative Justice Approach 
(Stanford University Press, California, 2007) 212. 
175 Organic Law No.08/96 (August 30 1996) Organic Law on the Organisation of Prosecution of Offences 
constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990 , a11s 2, 5, 
6, 8, 9 www.preventgenocide.org (accessed 25 September 2008). 
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civil damages which must be negotiated with the victims and the community. Community 
service is also available as a fo1m of punishment for offenders. 176 
This system is a good example of how justice can be achieved through both 
restorative and retributive elements as proposed by Daly. However punishment based on 
societal attitudes has been criticized by Reis as amounting to "sheer retribution which 
makes a mockery of the justice in theory and in practice." 177 In his eyes the system looks 
a lot like victors justice. However it must be remembered the Reis's view is based upon 
there being a prohibition against the prosecution of children at international law and his 
strong view that children are incapable of fanning the intent required for the crime of 
genocide. 178 Whether children are incapable of fanning this intent or not is beyond 
discussion of this paper, but it has already been found that no such prohibition against 
prosecution exists. 
Following from this example it is submitted that an approach encompassing both 
retributive and restorative elements is essential when dealing with the criminal 
responsibility of child soldiers. This is because it is the community themselves, civilians 
as protected persons in times of armed conflict, who are the victims of the atrocities. As 
will be illustrated below the attitude of the child soldiers, the nature of their c1imes and 
their ability to incite fear often makes it difficult for communities to readily accept them 
back and forgive them with open arms. 
Whilst supporting rehabilitation and reintegration as an alternative fo1m to justice 
for child soldiers, the flaw with Reis 's argument is that he does not give enough weight to 
the views of the community. Positive community views and input is essential for child 
soldiers to be rehabilitated and reintegrated back into society. If they are unforgiving as a 
result of lack of censure then this process will never be successful. 
176 Ibid, art 14(c) . 
177 "Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children for Participation in 
Internal Armed Conflict" above n 111 , 653 . 
178 Ibid, 645 . 
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However with the exception of Rwanda, the practice of the international 
community so far in dealing with child soldiers post conflict has mainly been to look to 
restorative elements alone. This is often because pressure from the international 
community has denied any sort of retributive element in any process, wishing to treat the 
children as victims and emphasising the need for rehabilitation rather than punishment. 
For example in regards to the possible prosecution of a child soldier UNICEF has 
stated: 179 
UNICEF believes that children alleged to have committed crimes while they were child 
soldiers should be considered prima1ily as victims of adults who have broken international 
law by recruiting and using children ... and that these individuals must be provided with 
assistance for their social integration. 
Fallowing from this their stance is that: 180 
There is a great need to concentrate on rehabilitating child soldiers to prevent them from 
d1ifting into a life of further violence, crime and hopelessness ... A much more deliberate 
effort needs to be made to demobilize both adult and child soldiers so as to offer not just to 
respite but also reconciliation. 
In post conflict situations views of organisations such as UNICEF are influential 
and taken into account as it is them who are out there taking active measures to help with 
the rehabilitation of child soldiers in war tom communities. They are therefore another 
stakeholder to take into account along with the victims, offenders and the wider 
community. 
However rehabilitation should not be used to foster a culture of impunity for child 
soldiers who have been the perpetrators of serious crimes. As argued by Morss instead it 
can and should be used as a factor in mitigation. 181 It has been used in this respect in both 
179 UNICEF "Statement by UNICEF Concerning the Case of Omar Khadr" (2 February 2008) Press 
Release www.unicef.org (accessed 25 September 2008). 
180 Ibid. 
181 "The Status ofChild Offenders Under International Criminal Justice: Lessons from Sierra Leone", 
above n I 17 , 223. 
41 
the ICTR and ICTY. In the case of Furundzija 182 the ICTY had his young age taken into 
account in sentencing. What is surprising however is that Furundzija was 23 when he 
committed the offences he was charged with. Therefore in the function of sentencing, 
rehabilitation does not rely on a specific age band, as a mitigating factor it is available to 
anyone. 
In the context of the argument for attributing criminal responsibility to child 
soldiers, why then should rehabilitation be used as excusing all child soldiers for the 
crimes they committed? Even if child soldiers were to be dealt with by a criminal 
process, it is more than likely rehabilitation would underpin all the sanctions available. 
As will be discussed below the SCSL specifically provided for this in their statute 
following Article 40( 4) of the CRC which states that: 183 
A variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and superv1s1on orders; counselling; 
probation; foster care; education and vocational training programmes and other alternatives 
to institutional care shall be available to ensure that children are dealt with in a manner 
appropriate to their well-being and proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence. 
Attributing criminal responsibility to child soldiers who have been the perpetrators of 
serious atrocities would therefore not ignore the case for their rehabilitation into society. 
Both Uganda and Siena Leone both experienced the problem of how to treat child 
soldiers post conflict. How they dealt with the situation will be examined below as well 
as the me1its of each approach. 
IX INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES SO FAR 
A Traditional Justice - Uganda 
The conflict in no11hem Uganda has persisted since 1986. The Lords Resistance 
A1my (LRA) under the command of Joseph Kony, aimed to overthrow Uganda's 
182 Prosecutor v Furundzij"a (Judgment) ( I O December 1998) IT-95-17 /1-T (Trial Chamber ICTY) upheld 
on appeal (21 July 2001 ). 
183 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25 , a1140(3). 
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Government and to rule Uganda according to the I O commandments. However, although 
the LRA attacked government forces at times, it primarily targeted the northern Ugandan 
civilian population whom Kony claimed to be punishing for their sins, particularly of not 
supporting him. Fighting took place in the Northern districts where the Acholi ethnic 
group was dominant. 184 
Because Joseph Kony and the LRA lacked a popular base of support they 
populated their forces through the abduction and forced conscription of children, usually 
aged between 1 L and 15 years. The LRA abducted approximately 20000 children during 
the 20 year conflict. 185 These children were not only used in combat but also to carry out 
mutilations on the civilian population to fuel insecurity. Girls were used as sex slaves and 
allocated to commanders in forced maITiages. Other atrocities cruTied out by the LRA on 
the civilian population were killings, beatings and sexual violence. Recruitment was also 
forced upon adults. 186 
In 2005 the ICC prosecutor unsealed ruTest waITants for Kony and four other 
leaders for crimes including rape, murder, slavery, sexual slavery, and the forced 
enlistment of children. 187 The aITest wruTants reportedly rattled the LRA commanders 
who began to talk of a peace agreement which would grant them immunity from 
prosecution. 188 The Juba Peace Process began in mid July 2006 between the LRA and the 
Ugandan Government. The agenda of this peace process includes cessation of hostilities, 
solution to the conflict, reconciliation and accountability, and a plan for disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration. As of this w1iting a peace deal has not yet been signed. 
However, before this process for peace had begun, the Ugandan Government had 
already attempted to take measures to break the cycle of violence in no1them Uganda by 
encouraging combatants of various rebel groups to leave their aimed groups without fear 
184Cecily Rose "Truth-telling and Reparations in Northern Uganda" (2008) 28 Boston Third World Law 
Journal 345 , 348["Truth-telling and Reparations in Northern Uganda"]. 
185 Ibid . 
186 Ibid. 
187 Jeffrey Gettleman "Uganda Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality" (September 15 2006) New York 
Times www.nytimes.com (accessed 26 September 2008) . 
188 "Truth-telling and Reparations in Northern Uganda", above n 184, 350 . 
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of prosecution. This came in the fonn of an Amnesty Act. Under this Act, amnesty is 
available for any Ugandan who has actually participated in combat, collaborated with 
perpetrators of, committed a crime in fmtherance of, or assisted or aided the conduct or 
prosecution of the war or am1ed rebellion.189 
Thus all child soldiers were covered whether they were voluntarily recruited , 
forcibly abducted or whether they participated directly or indirectly in hostilities. As a 
result of being granted amnesty, the government will not prosecute or punish such 
persons if they report to the nearest local or central government authority, renounce and 
abandon involvement in the war or aimed rebellion, and sun-ender any weapons in their 
possession . 190 In renouncing their involvement, a person's declai·ation need not be 
onerous or specify the crimes for which they seek amnesty. 
As at the end of 2006, 21 ,000 fonner rebels had received anmesty under the Act, 
with 6718 of these being children between the ages of 12-18.19 1 Furthennore the Amnesty 
Act establishes a commission whose job it is to help communities reconcile with those 
who have committed the offences. 192 This has led to the use of a disannainent , 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process for children which has involved support 
for their social and economic reintegration back into society as well as monito1ing and 
evaluation. 
Despite this more fonnal process for dealing with the reintegration of former 
combatants, many traditional Acholi leaders have advocated the use of traditional 
mechanisms for both the reintegration of children and adults back into communities. 
Many argue that such traditional mechanisms for cleansing, justice, and reconciliation 
represent important chaimels for reintegration and reconciliation which can and should be 
widely adopted .193 In the context of restorative justice, as mentioned earlier it is 
189 Amnesty Act 2000 (Ch 294 ), s 3(1 ). 
190 Ibid, s 4( I) . 
191 UN Disa1mament, Demobilisation and Resource Centre Uganda www.unddr.org (accessed 26 
September 2008). 
192 Amnesty Act 2000 (Ch 294 ), s 8 . 
193 "Truth-telling and Reparations in Northern Uganda", above n 184, 360 . 
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impo11ant for the communities as victims of atrocities to see the perpetrators go through 
this process so that they can welcome them back more readily. 
Such traditional methods include a cleansing ceremony known as Nyono Tong 
Gweno, the stepping on eggs, generally takes place when an individual has returned to a 
community following a significant time away pai1icularly after they have done something 
immoral or amoral. The ritual cleanses foreign elements to prevent them from entering 
the community and bringing misfortune. Because of the rituals importance to the people 
of northern Uganda the cleansing ceremony itself has become a pai1 of the amnesty 
process with the ceremony being perfo1med at the local authorities where combatants go 
to renounce and abandon their involvement in the war. 194 
The Mato Oput (drinking of the bitter root) ceremony is also an important 
mechanism for foste1ing peace and justice in no11hern Uganda. It is a sophisticated 
process involving many rights including a representative from both parties drinking oput, 
bitter root from a calabash. The root represents the bitterness between the clans and 
drinking it symbolizes washing away the bitterness between them. Killers ai·e accepted 
back into the community after they have paid compensation, admitted to their misdeeds 
and shared a meal , usually a roasted goat or sheep, with the relatives of their victim. The 
goat or sheep is provided by the victim's fainily symbolizing unity and a willingness to 
forgive and forget. Both pa11ies also cook and eat the liver of the goat or sheep. This is to 
show that their blood has been mixed and united and to symbolically wash away the 
bitterness within the blood of the human liver. The ceremony is not complete until the 
pai1ies finish all the food prepared for the day, finishing the food symbolizes that no 
b. · b h · 195 1tterness remams etween t e pa111es. 
194 Ibid, 361. See also Marc Lacey "V ictims of Uganda Atrocities Chose a Path of Forgiveness" (18 April 
2005) New York Times www .nytimes.com (accessed 26 September 2008); Jeffrey Gettleman "Uganda 
Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality" (September 15 2006) New York Times www .nytimes.com 
(accessed 26 September 2008). 
195 Ibid 362. See al o Marc Lacey ''Victims of Uganda Atrocities Chose a Path of Forgiveness" (18 Ap1il 
2005) New York Times www.nytimes.com (accessed 26 September 2008); Jeffrey Gettleman "Uganda 
Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality" (September 15 2006) New York Times www.nytimes.com 
(accessed 26 September 2008). 
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These traditional processes appear to address the restorative justice aim of taking 
into account all stakeholders to a c1ime. However the granting of amnesty and use of 
traditional justice mechanisms in Uganda has not escaped its c1iticism. Rose doubts the 
traditional Mato Oput ceremony's usefulness due to lack of knowledge amongst the 
Acholi people. 196 Local knowledge of the ceremony is second hand and few elders have 
perfo1med it. In the case of children, because it is no longer widely practiced they are 
unable to fully understand it. If the children are unable to understand , it is hard to see 
how justice can trnly be seen to be done. Fw1herrnore non-Acholi's who have been 
affected by the atrocities committed by the LRA may have little knowledge of Acholi 
practices and may question their relevance to them. In light of this it is difficult to see 
how understanding and forgiveness from all stakeholders can be fully achieved in 
pursuance of the aims ofrestorative justice. 
Rose also suggests that there is an overestimation of Acholi forgiveness. Just 
because the traditional mechanisms exist does not mean that the Acholi people have a 
special capacity to forgive. 197 Traditional justice is not unique to Uganda. Healing and 
forgiveness ceremonies have also taken place in other areas such as Mozambique. News 
repo11s have also given much attention to the Acholi forgiveness rights, at1icles stating 
comments like: 198 
Still , remarkably, a number of those who have been hacked by the rebels , who have seen 
their children carried off by them or who have endured years suffering in their midst say 
traditional justice must be the linchpin in ending the war. 
However there is evidence that not all those who have been victims feel this way. 
Some victims interviewed have stated that they "did not agree with the prospect of having 
the LRA leaders forgiven .. . but instead wanted justice, even rettibution ." 199 Furthe1more 
children who have returned to their communities find themselves homeless because "they 
196 Ibid, 369. 
197 Ibid, 366 . 
198 Marc Lacey "Victims of Uganda Atrocities Chose a Path of Forgiveness" (18 April 2005) New York 
Times www.nytimes.com (accessed 26 September 2008). 
199 
Human Rights Watch "Uprooted and Forgotten, Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in No,thern 
Uganda" (2005) 17 Human Rights Watch I 2(A), 40. www.hrw.org (accessed 26 September 2008) . 
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can not go back to the villages where people recall the night they returned with the rebels 
and massacred their relatives and neighbours - and sometimes, even, their own 
parents."200 
Therefore whilst cleansing and healing ceremony processes may have positive 
effects it is still important to recognise their limits. Customary healing and cleansing 
ceremonies are intended to provide a clean break from past atrocities.201 However it has 
been said that horrors cannot simply be erased from the collective memory as the 
customary practices require and "if drawing a line under the past fosters denial and 
impunity, there is also the risk of facilitating further human 1ights abuses."202 
The use of a general amnesty has also been criticized by Rose mainly due to the 
failure of the Commission setting up a truth-telling process.203 Under the Amnesty Act, 
the Commission must consider and promote appropriate reconciliation mechanism in 
northern Uganda, encourage dialogue and reconciliation within the spirit of the Amnesty 
Act, and "perform any other function that is associated or connected with the execution 
of the functions stipulated in [the] Act." 204 According to Rose, although the Commission 
has suppo11ed traditional ceremonies thereby promoting approp1iate reconciliation 
mechanisms, the above provision suggests the Commission can and should adopt a truth 
telling function or establish formal links with the traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms.205 
Truth telling as an option for reconciliation has a number of benefits that 
traditional mechanisms do not including ensming due process is caJTied out and that the 
200 Melanie Thernstrom "Charlotte, Grace, Janet and Caroline Come Home" (8 May 2005) New York 
Times www.nytimes.com (accessed 26 September 2008). 
20 1 Christina Clark "Juvenile Justice and Child Soldiering: Trends, Challenges, Dilemmas" in Charles 
Greenbaum, Philip Yeennan and Naomi Bacon-Shnoor (eds) Protection of Children During Armed 
Conflict: A Multi Disciplina1y Perspective, above n 109, 325. 
202 A Howana "Stealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Rural Mozambique," in 
Conciliation Resource (ed) Accord: The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective (Conciliation 
Resources , London, 1998) 7. 
203 "Truth-telling and Reparations in No11hern Uganda", above n 184, 371 . 
204 Amnesty Act 2000 (Ch 294 ), s 8. 
205 "Truth-telling and Reparations in Northern Uganda", above n 184,359. 
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needs and vulnerabilities of children are given special attention. However trnth telling 
operated in isolation can also have a downside. It is helpful to understand the nature of 
tmth-telling, its benefits and sho,t falls in the context of post conflict Sie1Ta Leone. 
B Truth and Reconciliation - Sierra Leone 
The 1990s saw the beginning of an era of internal anned conflict in SieITa Leone. 
As with Uganda, a significant feature of the conflict was the extensive use of children. 
The number is not fully known but estimates of child soldiers vaiy from 5000 - l 0000.206 
All sides to the conflict in SieITa Leone used children. Also noteworthy is the atrocities 
these child soldiers inflicted upon the civilian population. As mentioned earlier these 
included killing, abduction, amputation, mutilation, exto1tion, looting and destruction, 
rape and sexual violence, abduction and forced recruitment, forced displacement, forced 
detention, assault, torture, beating and forced labour.207 
The conflict eventually came to an end in 2002 with an entire nation m rums. 
Child fighters were left with no families, little to no education, and an unforgiving society 
was unable to assist them in rebuilding and restaiting life. 208 As said by an elder in a 
community:209 
We feared them. They were cruel and hard heai1ed; even more than the adults. They don ' t 
know what is sympathy; what is good and bad. If you beg an older one you may convince 
him to spare you, but the younger ones, they don ' t know what is sympathy, what is mercy. 
Those who have been rebels for so long have never learned it. 
The children on the other hand felt like victims:2 10 
206 The Final Report of th e Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone Volume 3b, Chapter 4: 
Children and th e Anned Conflict in Sierra Leone, above n 9, para 9. 
207 Ibid, para 228. 
208 David Crane "Strike TeITor No More: Prosecuting the Use of Children in Times of Conflict - The West 
African Extreme" in Ka,in Arts and Vesselin Popovski (eds) International Criminal Accountability and th e 
RightsofChildren,aboven 13,122. 
209 Human Rights Watch Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape: New Testimony fi'om Sierra 
Leone (1999) 11 3(A) Human Rights Watch Report, 54. 
2 10 Th e Final Report oft he Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone Volume 3b, Chapter 4: 
Children and the Anned Conflict in Sierra Leone, above n 9, para 8. 
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... Concerns amongst us children in Sie1Ta Leone are that the war was targeted at us. A brutal 
conflict which we did nothing to bring about but suffered and lost everything in it. 
In his repo1t on the establishment of the SCSL the Secretary General of the United 
Nations had to address this moral dilemma of how to deal with children who as the result 
of psychological and physical abuse had transformed from victims into 
perpetrators.21 1 The Government of Sie1Ta Leone had expressed its wish to see a process 
of judicial accountability for child combatants. It was said that the people of Sierra Leone 
would not look kindly upon a court which failed to bring to justice children who 
committed c1imes of that nature and spared them the judicial process of accountability.21 2 
0 · 'd d 213 pt1ons cons1 ere were: 
a) determining a minimum age of 18 and exempting all persons under that age from 
accountability and individual criminal responsibility; 
(b) having children between 15 to 18 years of age, both victims and perpetrators, recount 
their story before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or similar mechanisms, none of 
which is as yet functional ; and 
(c) having them go through the judicial process of accountability without punishment, in a 
court of law providing all internationally recognized guarantees of juvenile justice. 
As mentioned above non-governmental organisations views are also taken into 
account when dealing with courses of action in post conflict societies. In deciding the 
best course of action for Sien-a Leone they were particularly influential in their 
unanimous objection to any kind of judicial accountability for children below 18 years of 
age in fear that such a process would place at risk the entire rehabilitation programme 
they had already put in place.2 14 
211 "Report of the Secretary General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone", above n 90 
para 32. 
212 Ibid, para 35. 
213 Ibid, para 33. 
214 Ibid, para 35. 
49 
In 1998 a DDR process (as used in Uganda) had been initiated involving ex-
combatants from all of the armed factions. The overall objective of the process was to 
disaim and demobilise around 45 ,000 combatants from the factions and suppo11 their 
reintegration into society. In total , 6,774 children were put through the DDR process and 
by 2000 the reintegration pai1 of the process had begun.
2 15 
This process involves children below the age of 15 being sent to interim care 
centres in the care of UNICEF and their Child Protection Agency pai1ners. These centres 
then provide children with services such as family tracing, psychosocial counselling, 
basic health care and , where possible, fostering and or reunification. After reunification 
with their families or fostering, children ai·e integrated into fonnal educational projects 
under the UNICEF-assisted Community Education and Investment Programme.
2 16 
For those between the ages of 15 and 17 treatment under the DDR process is 
slightly different. Children are sent to "group homes" or allowed independent living and 
then provided with skills training under a Training and Employment Programme which 
can last for up to nine months. Children are also provided with a basic monthly allowance 
and given training materials. Some children are also put to work in agriculture and 
community-based initiatives. At the end of their training they are given stai1-up kits to 
prepare them for their new life and just as with those below the age of 15 , refen-al and 
counselling services are also provided.2 17 
As is evident from the detail above, the non-governmental organisations were 
justified in seeking to protect the DDR process they helped put in place. A judicial 
process of accountability put in place after this had been set up may have had the effect 
of scai·ing the children away and deterring them from engaging in the DDR process. With 
this in mind the best balance of all interests was found in the f01m of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which would be set up to work alongside the SCSL 
215 Th e Final Report of th e Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone Volum e 3b, Chapter 4: 
Children and the A11n ed Conflict in Sierra Leone, above n 9 , para 393 . 
216 Ibid, para 395 . 
217 Ibid, para 396 . 
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and have children aged between 15 to 18 years of age, both victims and perpetrators 
recount their stories. Although the SCSL was given capacity to try 15 to 18 year olds the 
statute indicated that where appropriate, reso1t should be had instead to the TRC.218 
TRCs serve as an important tool to build stability in societies where entire 
populations have been traumatised. They engage communities in accountability processes 
and are an effective and safe mechanism for children's involvement.219 The key 
objectives in Sie1Ta Leone were to create impartial records of human rights violations that 
occurred during the war, to provide a public forum for accountability, to help initiate the 
process of healing and reconciliation for victims, witnesses, perpetrators and families, to 
help restore a sense of justice in the social and political order and to make 
recommendations to the government to prevent future conflicts.220 
Sierra Leone created a new precedent for engaging children more systematically 
than any other TRC process and their views were specifically sought on what policies and 
procedures should be put in place to best serve their needs. Their involvement in actual 
truth-telling was entirely voluntary however safeguards were put in place to make the 
process more appealing to participate in. Child protection agencies were used to provide 
psychological support and to assist with statement making. But most importantly for the 
victim-perpetrator child soldier, confidentiality and anonymity in giving statements was 
guaranteed.221 
Having children recount their expe1iences and tell their sto1ies in their own way is 
a right guaranteed under the CRC.222 This process is not only beneficial in the sense of 
providing accountability through a community forum but the educational effect of TRCs 
218 Statute of the Special Cowt for SieITa Leone, above n 62, a11 15(5). 
219 Saudamini Siegrist "Child Pa11icipation in International Criminal Accountability Mechanisms: The Case 
of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission" in Karin Arts and Vessel in Popovski (eds) 
International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children, above n 13 , 58 . 
220 Ibid. 
22 1 Ibid, 60. These guarantees were included amongst eight principles for protection in The Framework for 
Protection which was a fonnal agreement between the SieITa Leone Truth and Reconciliation .Commission 
and child protection agencies. 
222 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25, a1112 . 
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is said to help children understand the past and provide a stepping stone for the future. 
223 
This imp011ance of this education has been highlighted in Sie1rn Leone through the 
publication of a child friendly version of the final repo11 of the TRC. 
The final repo11 of the TRC itself is comprehensive with the chapter on children 
seeking to understand the nature of their involvement in the conflict and emphasising 
their vulnerability in the context of the situation. Although the repo11 also outlines the 
atrocities the child soldiers committed it acknowledges the 'dual identity' victim-
perpetrator dilemma and makes it clear that the children who have come forward have 
b d l · · h" 2?4 een treate as neutra witnesses m t 1s process. -
However is treatn1ent as neutral witnesses enough? In some instances judicial and 
non judicial methods can operate together to provide an overall accountability 
mechanism, providing a mechanism through which victims voices can be heard whilst 
prosecuting those who are deserving of criminal responsibility.225 Although the TRC did 
provide useful evidence to prosecute those in the SCSL, the number of those prosecuted 
as bearing the greatest responsibility has been few. 
X POTENTIAL FOR A HYBRID APPROACH - GRAPPLING WITH THE 
DUEL IDENTITY CHILD SOLDIER IN THE FUTURE 
The problem with traditional justice and truth-telling as a mechanism for dealing 
with child soldiers appears to be that they can not work successfully in isolation. This is 
because they generally fail to take into account the perpetrator side of the duel identity 
child soldier. This shortfall was particularly evident in the truth-telling process in Sie1rn 
Leone which treated child soldiers as neutral witnesses. 
223 International Crim in al Ju stice and Children, above n 7, 131. 
224 Th e Final Report of th e Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone Volum e 3b, Chapter 4: 
Children and the Anned Conflict in Sierra Leone, above n 9 , para 225. 
225 International Crim in al Ju stice and Children, above n 7, 126. 
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It is submitted that taking a hybrid approach to justice for child soldiers is the best 
solution. This would involve a mix of the mechanisms we have seen utilised so far under 
international law. It has been suggested a more ideal process would operate similarly to 
the gacaca court system in Rwanda discussed earlier where offenders are categorised and 
punished accordingly with input from the community. The gacaca system itself has been 
criticized for its lack of due process and confidentiality. 226 Children must defend 
themselves against charges and it is impossible to ensure confidentiality as trials are held 
in public without recourse to rules of confidentiality. This goes against Article 40 of the 
CRC which states that children have the right to "have legal or other appropriate 
assistance in the preparation and presentation of his or her defence," "to have his or her 
privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings" and to: 227 
... have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent and impartial 
authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other 
appropriate assistance and, unless it is considered not to be in the best interest of the child, in 
particular, taking into account his or her age or situation ... 
The gacaca system does not take into account a child's age or situation and denies 
a child the right to appropriate assistance. These rights are also contained in the Beijing 
Rules. Therefore if a similar system were to be set up in the future these guarantees 
would have to be taken into account and implemented. It is argued that the TRC in Sien-a 
Leone could have operated similarly to the gacaca courts, dete1mining the cases 
involving child soldiers whom in its view ought to face trial before the SCSL whilst 
protecting fundamental minimum guarantees for children as set out in the CRC.228 
The SCSL had the mechanisms for this to work. Under Aiticle 7 of the SCSL 
Statute if a child is prosecuted standards of juvenile justice must be adhered to. 
Fu1them1ore there is no penalty of imp1isonment. Instead the Statute provides for care 
guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, counselling, foster care, 
226 Christina Clark "Juvenile Justice and Child Soldiering: Trends, Challenges, Dilemmas" in Charles 
Greenbaum, Philip Veerman and Naomi Bacon-Shnoor (eds) Protection of Children During Armed 
Conflict: A Multi Disciplina,y Perspective, above n 109,323. 
227 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 25, ar140. 
228 "Challenges in Establishing the Accountability of Child Soldiers", above n 68,333. 
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coITectional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved schools and , as 
appropriate, any programmes of disannament, demobilization and reintegration or 
programmes of child protection agencies.229 Child soldiers separated out as requi1ing a 
higher degree of accountability for their actions would therefore still receive the 
protections required under international law to cater to their vulnerabilities and 
rehabilitation into society. 
Such an approach may resolve the tension created from the absence of a fixed 
international minimum age for criminal responsibility. 230 However in this author's view a 
minimum age would still be required for participation in the tl11th-telling. From this point 
onwards age as a factor would bear little significance, rather it would be the nature of 
culpability for acts committed whilst a child soldier that would dete1mine whether they 
were to be prosecuted. 
In his article regarding the status of child offenders under international criminal 
justice, Morss goes one step further than this putting fo1ward the argument of criminal 
prosecution on the basis of the offence per se, with chronological age being admitted only 
as a potentially mitigating factor in sentencing. 23 1 The logic behind this being that if both 
the actus reus and mens rea can be proven by the prosecution, immunity on the basis of 
age should not be available to foreclose on the matter of intent. However even he agrees 
that such an approach would challenge the 011hodoxy of the special needs of child and 
juvenile offenders particularly given the progress that has been made implementing 
standards of juvenile justice in national jurisdictions.232 Yet in his view this may be the 
only way in which the short-comings under international law attributing c1irninal 
responsibility may be overcome. 
229 Statute of the Special Coui1 for Sierra Leone, above n 62 , art 7(2) . 
230 See Matthew Happold "The Age of Criminal Re pon ibility for International Crime Under 
International Law" in Karin Ar1s and Vessel in Popovski (eds) International Criminal Accountability and 
th e Rights of Children, above n 13 , 72 . 
23 1 'The Status of Child Offenders Under International Criminal Justice: Lessons from Siena Leone" above 
n 117 , 223. 
232 Ibid, 224 . 
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XI CONCLUSION 
The victim-perpetrator duel identity of the child soldier creates a moral dilemma 
with regards to the issue of criminal responsibility. On the one hand attention must be 
given to the vulnerability of children in the context of war, but on the other it is hard to 
ignore the atrocities they may commit voluntarily, pa11icularly when these are directed 
against the civilian population . After an analysis of the CUJTent international legal 
framework it has been found that by placing an emphasis on treating child soldiers as 
victims, the effect has been to grant all child soldiers with impunity. This includes those 
who are above the minimum age of recruitment whom in normal circumstances would be 
found to be criminally responsible for their actions. As observed, in some circumstances 
these child soldiers should be held accountable for their actions. 
It is difficult to justify impunity when the trend in national jurisdictions is to hold 
children criminally responsible for their actions but within a regime which protects their 
needs and vulnerabilities. In addition to this , children who commit crimes of murder and 
manslaughter are treated as adults under these national systems. If these children are 
capable of facing criminal responsibility for their actions, it is difficult to understand why 
child soldiers who are committing just as heinous acts and crimes escape this fate when 
international law through the CRC and other soft law instruments has the mechanisms for 
them to face the same responsibility. International law also has the experience and 
practice of states such as Sierra Leone, Uganda and Rwanda from which it can learn from 
and draw upon. As the paper has shown, what the diffe1ing approaches of these states has 
taught us is that restorative measures through traditional justice and truth-telling can not 
work in isolation to effectively deal with the child soldier problem. Censure through 
retributive justice is also needed in order to truly achieve forgiveness and reconciliation. 
With child soldie1ing criminalised under the Rome Statute ideally the use and 
abuse of children in armed conflict will decline over time. Nevertheless, there are still 
gaps in how international law deals with attributing responsibility. If similar issues must 
be dealt with in the future a hyb1id approach combining a mix of restorative and 
55 
ret1ibutive elements should be used to achieve the perfect blend of justice in order to 
meet the post conflict needs of the duel identity child soldier and the wider community. 
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